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sion of which no child should be deprived, whatever its future is to be. Apart from the manifold indirect advantages of the mastery of French or German, the study may be defended on the broad educational ground that he who knows no second language does not even know his own.

JAMES OLIPHANT.

LONDON.

GEDANKEN UND DENKER: Gesammelte Aufsätze. By Prof. Wilhelm Jerusalem. Wien & Leipzig; Braumüller. Pp. viii, 292.
 DER KRITISCHE IDEALISMUS UND DIE REINE LOGIK. EIN RUF IM STREITE. By Prof. Wilhelm Jerusalem. Wein & Leipzig; Braumüller. Pp. xii, 226.

The first of these books is mainly a collection of reviews and essays contributed by Prof. Jerusalem to the press, for the most part to the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna. They are interesting and vigorously written but "popular," and less important than the second book, which in spite (or perhaps in virtue) of its polemical form, is a distinct contribution to the crisis through which modern logic is passing. For Prof. Jerusalem is one of the most advanced and notable of the advocates of what in Germany is called *psychologism* in Logic, *i. e.* of the view that the doctrines of any tenable logic must arise out of, and rest upon, the psychological facts of actual thinking. The basis of logic therefore becomes empirical, its norms are not *a priori*, eternal and unalterable, but (like the rules of grammar) derived from the actual practice of thought and embody the ways of thinking which have verified and generally approved themselves. Logical rules facilitate and "economize" thought, and "the original and persistent task of knowledge is to enrich the content of life, and to increase the possibilities of happiness" (p. 85). Hence knowledge has arisen from the will to live and its theory is a genetic and biological psychology of thought (p. 146).

That is to say, Prof. Jerusalem has set out from the same idea from which the pragmatic movement in the English-speaking world has drawn its chief inspiration, viz: that it is necessary to apply the psychical facts of our cognitive procedure (as modern psychology has revealed them) to the reform of logical tradition. The natural result is that he arrives at very nearly the same conclusions as the pragmatists. For example he denies the existence of truths *per se* (p. 109) or "absolute" (p. 118): he points out that

"true and false originally mean merely useful or harmful in a biological sense; or, more precisely, the valuation bestowed on a completed interpretation, in virtue of the usefulness or harmfulness of the measures to which it led" (p. 162-3). Again (p. 165) "What can this truth, which differs in content for every species of conscious being and is in no wise a reflection of things in themselves, essentially be but that way of conceiving which, in connection with the whole organization of the species, its strength and its needs, leads to useful consequences? . . . "With the honorable title of 'true' we endow those ideas which, when acting as real forces or movements in us, induce salutary behavior." (P. 167) "Even now we have no other criterion for the truth of a judgment than the consequences of the judgment" (this last is Peirce's principle almost *verbatim*).

Even the "humanist" extensions of pragmatism are paralleled. E. g. (p. 140) "all cognition is human cognition, and 'true' and 'false' have a meaning only for men that judge. All talk about 'consciousness in general,' or 'universal consciousness,' or 'truths *per se*,' which remain the same whether they are grasped by men or gods, is criticism of knowledge no longer, but is uncritical, dogmatic, and moreover arbitrary and aimless, metaphysics." So, too, the inevitableness of anthropomorphism is admitted (p. 150, 181) and the prevalence of intellectualism condemned (p. 15, 136).

It cannot, indeed, be contended that Prof. Jerusalem has drawn all the consequences of which his method seems logically capable, or even all that have been drawn by others. It is extraordinarily difficult to sustain so novel a standpoint with unyielding consistency, and to guard against relapses into older ways. And so we ought not, perhaps, to be so puzzled to find that Prof. Jerusalem also, even after his strenuous polemic against Husserl's "pure logic" and after a declaration (p. 157) that "the development of the cognitive instinct beyond its biological significance is itself only a biological development," analogous to the overdevelopments of the imitative and sexual instincts, concedes that "we can really get to purely theoretic judgments" (p. 169). This, however, only seems to mean that a taste for the "theoretic" function grows up, which is not psychologically felt to refer to any end beyond itself, and a thoroughgoing pragmatist would not hesitate to declare the "purity" of such theoretic functioning to be quite illusory.

Again Prof. Jerusalem's conception of the metaphysical completion which a psychological epistemology requires (p. 220-1) seems

to me to be still conceived in a quite gratuitously intellectualistic fashion. I am somewhat disposed to question also whether the *epistemological* realism which is pragmatically justified by the *de facto* success of the assumption of an "independent" external world is not too easily converted by Prof. Jerusalem into a *metaphysical* realism, which has as little real interest or importance for logic as antithetical idealism, so long as both are conceived intellectualistically. But these are minor blemishes in what is on the whole an admirably conceived book, which gains ethical interest from the author's firm grasp of the fact that the new philosophy is destined to keep more in touch with human life than the abstractions which were supposed to be true for all "intelligence." He perceives that by recalling logic from the isolation to which it had been relegated (p. 78), we shall the better appreciate our powers of cognition, and be better equipped to control our own destiny (p. viii). And that after all is so far from being a degradation of pure reason as to portend a fulfillment of the very systematization of ends which Plato failed to achieve intellectualistically in his "Idea of Good."

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THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE. By Carveth Read, M. A., Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic in University College, London. London: Adam and Charles Stock, 1905. Pp. 354.

Professor Read's book is a "study of the validity and adequacy of knowledge and belief" regarding Nature. His use of the term Nature excludes the Ideals expressed in Polity, Religion, Art, and Virtue. The Metaphysics of Ideals is a distinct study and does not come within the scope of the present work. That branch of metaphysics may yet be treated by him. For he is not sceptical of its importance; and various statements scattered through this book show that he is not afflicted with the paralysis of self-suspicion and fear which seizes many thinkers in facing such problems.

He approaches his subject in a hopeful mood; but his expectations are modest. Speculation, he realizes, is in its infancy. "Our descendants may perhaps show a Newton as we show an ape." We cannot therefore expect to know things with any degree of completeness. "In the fulness of time it may be possible to hold beliefs with intelligence as well as conviction. . . . That time is not yet; and meanwhile the reproach of 'scepticism' is an appeal